Attorney's Docket No.: 42P15739

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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In re Application for:

Francis X. McKeen

Application No.: 10/644,399

Filed: August 19, 2003

For: METHOD AND APPRATUS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FROM A

BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACK

Examiner: Meonske, Tonia L.

Art Group: 2181

Conf. No.: 7924

DECLARATION PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §1.131

Mail Stop Amendment Commissioner for Patents P. O. 1450 Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Dear Sir:

- I, Francis X. McKeen, hereby declare that:
- 1. I am a citizen of the United States of America.
- 2. I currently reside at 10612 NW LeMans Ct. Portland, OR 97229.
- 3. I am currently an employee of Intel Corporation in Santa Clara, California.
- I have been an employee of Intel Corporation since Oct 30, 1995.
- 5. My current title at Intel Corporation is Hardware Engineer.
- 6. I am the sole-inventor of the above-identified patent application.

- 7. I have reviewed U.S. Patent 6,996,677 issued to Lee et al. ("Lee"), which was filed on February 20, 2003. <u>Lee</u> claims priority from provisional patent application No. 60/429,839 filed on November 25, 2002. The Examiner cites <u>Lee</u> against the claims of the above-identified application.
- 8. The invention disclosed and claimed in the above-identified patent application was conceived in the United States of America at least as early as October 18, 2002, as evidenced by Intel Corporation Invention Disclosing Form (IDF) having ID #28002 (a copy of which is attached herein). This document was reduced to writing internally within Intel Corporation at least as early as the date on the document; i.e., October 18, 2002. The foils referenced by the IDF is a presentation entitled "LT Stack Protection," (a copy of which is attached herein). This document demonstrates conception of the claimed invention of the instant application. Although Revision 0.1 of the LT Stack Protection document indicates an August 28, 2007 date, as indicated in the attached screen print, the document was first created on March 9, 2001. Revision 1 of the LT Stack protection document was completed at least as early as the date on the date on the IDF document; i.e., October 18, 2002. Between at least October 2002 and its constructive reduction to practice by the filing of the above-captioned patent application on August 19, 2003, I directed various meetings with Intel's software and hardware design teams in a diligent effort to reduce the invention to practice. In addition, as a result of the meeting, I revised the LT Stack Protection document to provide Revision 0.2 of the LT Stack Protection document (a copy of which is attached herein). Revision 0.2 of the LT Stack Protection document was reduced to writing internally within Intel Corporation at least as early as the date on the document; i.e., July 2, 2003. Revision 0.2 of the LT Stack Protection document provides evidence of diligence between February 2003 and the constructive reduction to practice of the claimed invention of the instant application by the filing of the above captioned patent application on August 19, 2003. Therefore, the conception and diligence towards reduction to practice of the invention disclosed and claimed in the above-identified patent application occurred prior to the filing date of Lee.

42P15739

Oct-01-07

The documents provided herewith are confidential. It is Intel Corporation's practice to maintain in secrecy all confidential documents. I believe that the documents have at all times prior to the filing date of the above-captioned application been maintained in a confidential manner.

I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the above-identified application or any patent issued thereon.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: 1 Oct

Full Name:

Francis X. McKeen

Citizenship:

United States of America

Residence:

10612 NW LeMans Ct.

Portland, OR 97229

T-619 THE INVENTION DISCLOSUL

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION located at http://legal.intel.com/patent/index.htm

28002

DATE: October 18, 2002

MOBILE PLATFORMS/MPG/MPA

It is important to provide accurate and detailed information on this form. The information will be used to evaluate your invention for possible filing as a patent application. Invention Disclosure forms MUST be sent

ntel Phone Number:	First Name: Francis (F	rank)	MLV
	Intel Fax Number:	TOTIN)	M.J. X
E-mail address: frank.mckeen@intel.com	WHAT I CALL MAINTEN		Mailstop: CO5-166
Citizenship: USA	Are you a contractor?	Yes:	WWID: 10075788
Home Address: 10612 NW LeMans Cr.	Time you a commacion	106.	No: X
City: Portland	State: OR	Zip: 97229	Callete u 110 a
Corporate Level Group: MPG	Division:MPA	Zip. 31228	Country: USA
Supervisor: Krishnan Ravichandran	WWID: 10048707	M/S:RNB6-52	Subdivision: CASA Phone #: 765-5308
ast Name:			
ntel Phone Number:	First Name:		M.I.
E-mail address:	Intel Fax Number:		Mailstop:
Citizenship:			WWID:
Home Address:	Are you a contractor?	Yes:	No:
City:			
Corporate Level Group:	State:	Zip;	Country:
Supervisor:	Division:		Subdivision:
	WWID:	M/S:	Phone #:
ast Name:	I STAN		
ntel Phone Number:	First Name:		M.I.
-mail address:	Intel Fax Number:		Mailstop:
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orporate Level Group:	Division:	Zip:	Country:
	WWID:	MS:	Subdivision:
pervisor:			Phone #:

- include several key words to describe the technology area of the invention in addition to # 3 above: Buffer overflow; Stack smashing, virus attack
- 5. Stage of development (i.e. % complete, simulations done, test chips if any, etc.): Conceptual
- 6a. Has a description of your invention been (or planned to be) published outside of Intel: No.
- If YES, was the manuscript submitted for pre-publication approval through the Author Incentive Program:
- If YES, please identify the publication and the date published:

6b. Has your invention been used/sold or planned to be used/sold by intel or others? No.

If YES, date it was sold or will be sold:

6c. Does this invention relate to technology that is or will be covered by a SiG (special interest group)/standard or specification?

If YES, name of SIG/standard/specification:

6d. If the Invention is embodied in a semiconductor device, actual or anticipated date of tapeout? Could be fall of 2003

6e. If the invention is software, actual or anticipated date of any beta tests outside intel: Soon

- 7. Was the invention conceived or constructed in collaboration with anyone other than an intel blue badge employee or in performance of a project involving entitles other than Intel (e.g. government, other companies, universities or consortia)? NO: If YES, name of Individual or entity:
- 8. Is this invention related to any other invention disclosure that you have recently submitted? If so, please give the title and

PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW THE DIRECTIONS ON HOW TO WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR INVENTION

Try to limit your description to 2-3 pages Do NOT attach a presentation, white paper, or specification ANSWER ALL OF THE QUESTIONS BELOW

Please provide a description of the invention and include the following information:

- Describe in detail what the components of the invention are and how the invention works. 1. See folis inserted in email
- Describe advantage(s) of your invention over what is currently being done. 2.

Currently there is no defense against buffer overflows and stack smashing attacks. A proposal to support a non LT version of dual stacks has been written up in an academic paper, Architectural Support for Defending Against Buffer Overflow Attacks, Xu, Kalbarczyk, Patel, Iyer, from the Center for Reliable Computing, University of Illinois, Urbana. There proposal is not the first to propose dual stacks, in this proposal there is no need to change legacy software to support the

You MUST include at least one figure illustrating the invention. If the invention relates to 3. software, include a flowchart or pseudo-code representation of the algorithm. See the follset

Value of your invention to intel (how will it be used?). 4.

Allows Intel computers to stop spread of virus'.

Explain how your invention is novel. If the technology itself is not new, explain what makes it 5.

This invention allows virus protection of legacy code by use of the LT monitor. It allows LT to protect the LHS code integrity.

identify the closest or most pertinent prior art that you are aware of. See paper reference above.

Who is likely to want to use this invention or infringe the patent if one is obtained and how would 7. Infringement be detected? AMD, Microsoft

> HAVE YOUR SUPERVISOR READ AND FORWARD IT ELECTRONICALLY VIA E-MAIL TO "INVENTION DISCLOSURE SUBMISSION"

DATE:	SUPERVISOR:
PAGE 20/42 * RCVD AT 10/1/2007 5:16:16 PM (Eas)	stern Davlight Time] * SVR:USPTO-EFXRF-3/8 * DNIS:2738300 * CSID:3108205988 * DURATION (mm-ss):13-28

BY APPROVING, I (SUPERVISOR) ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS DISCLOSURE, AND RECOMMEND THAT THE HONORARIUM BE PAID

RichEditWindow

T Stack Protection

Frank McKeen

August 28, 2007

Rev 0.1

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Agenda

Mobile Platforms Group

Current LT value proposition

Solution gap

Buffer overflow problem

LT enhancement for stack attack mitigation

Security Concerns

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Activity	Risks/Concerns	Recommer	Recommended Solution	
		2003	2004	2005-2006
Access data from	Confidential data intercepted	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL
	Unauthorized access	PWD	MAL	TPM/LT
	Display/keyboard sniffing			17
	Secure Transaction	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL	
	Platform authentication	DMD	TPM	TPM/LT
E-commerce fransaction	Secure Transaction	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL/LT
	DRM	TRS	TRS	17
	Display/keyboard sniffing			
	Platform authentication	PWD	TPM	TPM/LT
Email	Virus protection	Virus scan	Virus scan	LT may help
	Confid. email intercepted	IPSEC	IPSEC	DESEC
	Stack Smash	Discipline	Discipline	Discipline
Use Wireless addess	Wireless data security	WEP	NSS	802.77
	Platform authentication	DWD	TPM	TPM/LT
Notebook stolen	Data theft protection	DWD	Port token	Port token/LT
Exposed to internet	Virus protection	Virus scan	Virus scan	LT may help
	Stack Smash	Discipline	Discipline	Discipline
nse NB in public	Password stolen	Educate	Educate	Educate
Intel Contidential	Over shoulder reading	Educate	Educate	Educate

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Mobile Platforms Group

Stack Smash Attacks

- Stack Smashing attacks account for ~ 50% of security vulnerabilities reported.
- All major worms used stack smashing to bypass control of the machine
- LT does not currently solve stack smashing problem
- LT would not protect against Code Red, Nimda, etc.
- LT impact on current internet security problems is limited to DRM and e-commerce

Enhance LT to reduce stack smashing

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How smashing works

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Before attack

Parameters Return Address Saved FP Buffer[n] Buffer[0] Local variable

After attack

Fill buffer and more to overwrite return address

Stack groaws downward

Data is written past the end of the buffer

Overwrites the return address

Return address points to code which will redirect the program to new spot

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- Each Call deposits address in both stacks
- Each return checks that addresses match
- Failed matches are attacks.

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Protection with LT

- Push the control stack into LT space where only the microcode and SVMM can touch it.
- Protects against other programs smashing both stacks
- Microcode checks two stacks to validate correct address
- VMExit generated when the two values miscompare
- VMCS contains a bit which indicates the feature is enabled for a guest
- VMExit generated on loads to SP which relocate it.
- Monitor maintains copy of the control stack.

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Changes

Microcode checks the values on both stacks

Can we experiment with patch?

stack. Each time the SP is loaded the CSP must be A second SP defined which points at the control loaded.

How do we determine live/dead for stacks?

Memory once used for stack could be kept active for a long

- All stacks are part of the memory image

Monitor keeps CSP as long as the stack is kept in memory.

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Current LT value proposition

Solution gap

Buffer overflow problem (4)

LT enhancement for stack attack mitigation

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Accase data from	Activity	Risks/Concerns	Recommen	Recommended Solution	
om Contidential data intercepted VPN/SSL VPN/SSL Unauthorized access PWD TPM TPM Secure Transaction PWD TPM TPM TPM Secure Transaction PWD TPM			2003	2004	2005-2006
Unauthorized access PWD TPM IPM Display/keyboard sniffing PWD TPM PANSSI APHOSSI PWD TPM IPM PATFORM AUTHORICATION PWD TRS TRS TRS Display/keyboard sniffing PWD TPM TRS TRS TRS Display/keyboard sniffing PWD TPM TPM TRS TRS TRS Display/keyboard sniffing PWD TPM TPM PWD TPM PWD PWD TPM PATFORM PHATFORM PWD TPM PWD PWD PWD PWD TPM PATFORM PHATFORM PWD	Access data from	Confidential data intercepted	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL	APN/SSL
Display/keyboard sniffing Secure Transaction PWD PWD TPM PRIORM Secure Transaction PWD TRS TRS Display/keyboard sniffing Platform authentication Virus protection Confid. email intercepted Stack Smash Data theft protection Data theft protection PWD PWD TPM PWD TPM SSN Wireless data security PWD PWD TPM PWEP SSN Platform authentication PWD PWD PUTUS scan TPM PWEP SSN Platform authentication PWD PWD TPM PWEP SSN Platform authentication PWD PWEP SSN PUTUS scan TPM PWEP SSN PWE	enterprise	Unauthorized access	PWD	TPM	TPM/LT
Secure Transaction PWD TPM TPM SEL NPM SEL NPM TRS		Display/keyboard sniffing			ΕŢ
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Secure Transaction VPN/SSL VPN/SSL VPN/SSL DRM TRS TRS TRS Display/keyboard sniffing Platform authentication PWD TPM TPM Confid. email intercepted IPSEC IPSEC Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Stack Smash Platform authentication PWD PWD TPM Platform authentication PWD PWD Port token Platform authentication PWD Port token Platform sucception PWD Port token PWD Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Force Virus protection Wirus scan Stack Smash Discipline Educate Educate Educate		Platform authentication	PWD	TPM	TPM/LT
DRM Display/keyboard sniffing Platform authentication Virus protection Comfid. email intercepted Stack Smash Platform authentication Data theft protection PWD PWD Port token Over shoulder reading Educate Educate Educate Display/keyboard sniffing PWD TPM PWD TPM Postar theft protection PWD Port token Port coken Educate Educate Educate	E-commerce	Secure Transaction	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL	VPN/SSL/LT
Display/keyboard sniffing Platform authentication Virus protection Confid. email intercepted PSEC IPSEC IPSEC IPSEC IPSEC IPSEC IPSEC IPM PWD PWD PWD Port folcen Pernet Virus protection PWD Port folcen IPM PWD Port folcen IPM PWD Port folcen Pernet Virus protection PWD Port folcen IPM PWD PWD PORT folcen IPM PWD PORT folcen IPM PWD	transaction	סאייו	TRS	TRS	LT
Platform authentication Virus protection Virus protection Confid. email intercepted Confid. email intercepted Confid. email intercepted Stack Smash Data theft protection Data theft protection PWD PWD PWD Portfoken Pythus scan Virus scan Prassword stolen Educate Educate Educate Educate		Display/keyboard sniffing			5
Virus protection Virus scan Virus scan Virus scan Virus scan Virus scan Confid. email intercepted Discipline Discipline Discipline Stack Smash PMD TPM PMD ennet Virus protection PWD Port token Part token ennet Virus protection Virus scan Virus scan Virus scan Password stolen Educate Educate Over shoulder reading Educate Educate		Platform authentication	DWD	TPM	TPM/LT
Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Discipline Discipline Data theft protection Data theft protection Virus protection Stack Smash Discipline Di	Email	Virus protection	Virus scan	Virus scan	LT may help
Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Discipline Stack Smash Platform authentication PWD PWD TPM TPM PWD		Confid. email intercepted	IPSEC	IPSEC	IPSEC
Heres data security WEP SSN Platform authentication PWD TPM ernet Virus protection Virus scan Virus scan Discipline Discipline Password stolen Password stolen Educate Educate Educate		Stack Smash	Discipline	Discipline	Discipline
Platform authentication PWD TPM Data theft protection Wirus scan Virus scan Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Password stolen Educate Educate Over shoulder reading Educate Educate	Use Wireless addess	Wireless data security	WEP	SSN	802.11i
ernet Virus protection Virus scan Virus scan Virus scan Stack Smash Discipline Educate Educate Educate Educate		Platform authentication	DWD	TPM	TPW/LT
ernet Virus protection Stack Smash Password stolen Over shoulder reading Wirus scan Virus scan Discipline Educate Educate Educate Educate	Notebook stolen	Data theft protection	DWD	Port token	Port token/LT
Stack Smash Discipline Discipline Password stolen Educate Educate Educate Educate	Exposed to internet	Virus protection	Virus scan	Virus scan	LT may help
Password stolen Over shoulder reading Educate Educate		Stack Smash	Discipline	Discipline	Discipline
Over shoulder reading Educate Educate	Ose NB in pub	Password stolen	Educate	Educate	Educate
Intel Secret		Over shoulder reading	Educate	Educate	Educate
	Intel Secret				6

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- Stack Smashing attacks account for ~ 50% of security vulnerabilities reported.
- All major worms used stack smashing to bypass control of the machine
 - LT does not currently solve stack smashing problem
- LT would not protect against Code Red, Nimda, etc.
- LT impact on current internet security problems limited to DRM and e-commerce
- Moving code to RHS does not mitigate threat

Enhance LT foreduce stacksmashing

EGYN MINCK	Ð	Aler atack		
rameters		Parameters		
turn Address	OVO	Address of		Vizue
ved FP	o) (bypass code		code
ıffer[n]	nore	Virus code	_	
iffer		Virus code		
iffer[0]		Virus code		
cal variable		Virus code		
cal variable		Local variable		
		Local variable		

- Data is written past the end of the buffer 4
 - Overwrites the return address
- Return address points to code which will redirect the program to new spot 0
 - Routine executes a return which gets the address of the virus code and passes control to the virus 3

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- Push the control stack into LT space where only the microcode and SVMM can touch it.
- Protects against other programs smashing both stacks
- Microcode checks two stacks to validate correct address
- VMExit generated when the two values miscompare
- VMCS contains a bit which indicates the feature is enabled for a guest
- VMExit generated on loads to SP which relocate it.
- Monitor maintains copy of the control stack.

P 036/042

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- Microcode checks the values on both stacks
- Can we experiment with patch?
- stack. Each time the SP is loaded the CSP must be A second SP defined which points at the contro oaded.
- How do we determine live/dead for stacks?
- Memory once used for stack could be kept active for a long time
- All stacks are part of the memory image
- Monitor keeps CSP as long as the stack is kept in memory 1

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Mobile Platforms Group Privilege leve Task Switch MOV SS Intel Secret ESP (1) 6 4

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- Improve integrity of the entire machine and avoid moving all software to the RHS.
- No changes to the current programming model for non monitor code
- Protects all legacy software
- Reduces enabling effort substantially

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From-BST&Z

The CSP must be defined architecturally as

Ø

Can't be accessed by current instruction definitions.

register

- Use new instruction which sends data to CSP
- New exception should be defined to handle the mismatch case.
- Not absolutely necessary but mainly a performance enhancement. Could use current event.
- Microcode change to patch the call and ret. Potentially faster time to market?

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